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Abstract. Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) supports to check whether two
ciphertexts encrypted under different public keys contain the same message or not. PKEET has
many interesting applications such as keyword search on encrypted data, encrypted data partitioning
for efficient encrypted data management, personal health record systems, spam filtering in encrypted
email systems and so on. However, the PKEET scheme lacks an authorization mechanism for a user
to control the comparison of its ciphertexts with others. In 2015, Ma et al. introduce the notion of
PKEET with flexible authorization (PKEET-FA) which strengthens privacy protection. Since 2015,
there are several follow-up works on PKEET-FA. But, all are secure in the random-oracle model.
Moreover, all are vulnerable to quantum attacks. In this paper, we provide three constructions of
quantum-safe PKEET-FA secure in the standard model. Proposed constructions are secure based on
the hardness assumptions of integer lattices and ideal lattices. Finally, we implement the PKEET-FA
scheme over ideal lattices.
1 Introduction
Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET), which supports the equality test of underlying mes-
sages of two ciphertexts with the help of trapdoor, was first introduced by Yang et al. [22]. The property
of equality test is of use for various practical applications, such as keyword search on encrypted data,
encrypted data partitioning for efficient encrypted data management, personal health record systems,
spam filtering in encrypted email systems and so on. But, to protect the privacy of the data owner, it
is required to have an authorization mechanism. In this direction, the first successful effort was by Tang
[19], where a fine-grained authorization policy enforcement mechanism was integrated into PKEET. This
work was further extended by using two collaborating proxies to perform the equality tests [20]. Moreover,
an all-or-nothing PKEET was presented by Tang [21]. But, all the above schemes are one-way against
chosen-ciphertext attack (OW-CCA). However, for some special scenarios, such as database applications,
OW-CCA security may not be strong enough. Motivated by this, the security models of PKEET were
revisited by Lu et al. [11], who proposed several new and stronger security definitions. A new notion,
called public key encryption with delegated equality test (PKE-DET), was introduced by Ma et al. [15],
where the delegated party is only allowed to deal with the work in a multi-user setting. Ma et al. [14]
proposed a new primitive, called public key encryption with equality test supporting flexible authoriza-
tion (PKEET-FA), to strengthen privacy protection. Lin et al. [10], remove the pairing computation
from the construction of Ma et al. [14]. However, they are all proven to be secure in the random oracle
model based on the number-theoretic hardness assumption. It is a need of the age to construct secure
primitive based on post-quantum secure hardness assumption. Therefore it is necessary to construct such
a scheme in the standard model based on post-quantum secure hardness assumption. Recently, Lee et al.
[9] proposed a generic construction of PKEET in the standard model from which it is possible to mount
a lattice-based construction. Duong et al. [7] proposed a concrete construction of PKEET secure in the
standard model based on the hardness of LWE problem. Both of these two works do not consider the
authorization mechanism.
Our contribution: In this paper, our contribution is fourfold:
– According to the best of our knowledge, we propose the first concrete construction of a PKEET-FA
scheme based on the hardness assumption of integer lattices.
– We describe a lattice-based instantiation of PKEET-FA from Lee et al.’s [9] generic construction.
– To have better efficiency in respect of the size of parameters, we propose a construction of PKEET-FA
scheme based on the hardness assumption of ideal lattices.
– Finally, we implement the PKEET-FA scheme over ideal lattices.
We first employ the multi-bit full IBE by Agrawal et al. [1] and then directly transform it into a PKEET
scheme. Finally, we have devoleped the authorization algorithms to construct PKEET-FA over integer
lattices. In our scheme, a ciphertext is of the form CT = (CT1,CT2,CT3,CT4) where (CT1,CT3) is the
encryption of the message m, as in the original IBE scheme, and (CT2,CT4) is the encryption of H(m)
in which H is a hash function. In order to utilize the IBE scheme, we employ a second hash function
H ′ and create the identity H ′(CT1,CT2) before computing CT3 and CT4. To instantiate PKEET-FA
from [9], we have employed the HIBE from [1]. Finally, we have used the ideal version of IBE of [1] from
[4] to construct PKEET-FA over ideal lattices. As compared to the previous constructions, the proposed
constructions are computationally efficient due to the absence of exponentiation and evaluation of pairing;
see Table 1. Moreover, all the previous constructions are secure in the random oracle model, whereas, all
the proposed constructions are secure in the standard model.
Table 1. Efficency Comparison with Existing PKEET.
Scheme CEnc CDec CTd CTest Std./RO Asmp
[22] 3 Exp 3 Exp - 2 Pairing RO CDH
[19,20] 4 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 Pairing RO CDH + DDH
[21] 5 Exp 2 Exp 0 4 Exp RO CDH
[15]-Type 1 6 Exp 5 Exp 0 2 Pairing+ 2 Exp RO CDH
[15]-Type 2 6 Exp 5 Exp 2 Exp 2 Pairing+ 2 Exp RO CDH
[15]-Type 3 6 Exp 5 Exp 1 Exp 2 Pairing+ 2 Exp RO CDH
[10]-Type 1 4 Exp 3 Exp 0 2 Exp RO DDH
[10]-Type 2 4 Exp 3 Exp 1 Exp 0 RO DDH
[10]-Type 3 4 Exp 3 Exp 1 Exp 1 Exp RO DDH
Proposed- Type 1,2, 3 0 0 0 0 Std. LWE
(Over Integer Lattices)
Proposed- Type 1 0 0 0 0 Std. LWE
(Instantiation of
Lee et al.’s [9]construction)
Proposed- Type 1,2, 3 0 0 0 0 Std. RLWE
(Over Ideal Lattices)
CEnc, CDec, CTd, CTest: the computation complexity of algorithms for encryption, decryption, Td and Test; Asmp:
assumption; Exp: exponentiation; pairing: pairing evaluation; Std./RO: security in standard model or random
oracle model; CDH: computational Diffie-Hellman assumption; DDH: decesional Diffie-Hellman assumption;
LWE: learning with error problem; RLWE: Ring LWE.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Public key encryption with equality test supporting flexible authorization
(PKEET-FA)
In this section, we will recall the model of PKEET-FA and its security model.
We remark that a PKEET-FA system is a multi-user setting. Hence we assume that in our system
throughout the paper, each user is assigned with an index i with 1 ≤ i ≤ N where N is the number of
users in the system.
Definition 1 (PKEET-FA). PKEET-FA consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:
– Setup(λ): On input a security parameter λ and set of parameters, it outputs the a pair of a user’s
public key PK and secret key SK.
– Enc(PK,m): On input the public key PK and a message m, it outputs a ciphertext CT.
– Dec(SK,CT): On input the secret key SK and a ciphertext CT, it outputs a message m′ or ⊥.
Suppose that the receiver Ui (resp. Uj) has a public/secret key pair (PKi, SKi) (resp. (PKj , SKj)), whose
ciphertext is CTi (resp. CTj). To realize Type-α (α = 1, 2, 3) authorization for Ui and Uj , algorithm Tdα
(α = 1, 2, 3) is defined to generate trapdoor for Ui’s ciphertext (or ciphertexts) that is (are) required to
be compared with Uj’s ciphertext (or ciphertexts), and Testα (α = 1, 2, 3) algorithm to determine whether
two receivers’ ciphertexts contain the same message or not.
Type-1 Authorization:
– Td1(SKi): On input the secret key SKi of the user Ui, it outputs a trapdoor td1,i for Ui.
– Test(td1,i, td1,j ,CTi,CTj): On input two trapdoors td1,i, td1,j and two ciphertexts CTi,CTj for users
Ui and Uj respectively, it outputs 1 or 0.
Type-2 Authorization:
– Td2(SKi,CTi): On input the secret key SKi and ciphertext CTi of the user Ui, it outputs a trapdoor
td2,i for (Ui,CTi).
– Test(td2,i, td2,j ,CTi,CTj): On input two trapdoors td2,i, td2,j and two ciphertexts CTi,CTj for users
Ui and Uj respectively, it outputs 1 or 0.
Type-3 Authorization:
– Td3,i(SKi,CTi): On input the secret key SKi and ciphertext CTi of the user Ui, it outputs a trapdoor
td3,i for (Ui,CTi).
– Td3,j(SKj): On input the secret key SKj of the user Uj, it outputs a trapdoor td3,j for Uj.
– Test(td3,i, td3,j ,CTi,CTj): On input two trapdoors td3,i, td3,j and two ciphertexts CTi,CTj for users
Ui and Uj respectively, it outputs 1 or 0.
Remark 2. Type-3 authorization is a combination of Type-1 authorization and Type-2 authorization,
which is for comparing a single ciphertext of Ui with all ciphertexts of Uj.
Correctness. We say that a PKEET scheme is correct if the following three condition hold:
(1) For any security parameter λ, any user Ui and any message m, it holds that
Pr
[
Dec(SKi,CTi) =m
∣∣∣∣∣ (PKi, SKi)← Setup(λ)CTi ← Enc(PKi,m)
]
= 1.
(2) For any security parameter λ, any users Ui, Uj and any messages mi,mj , it holds that:
Pr
Test

tdα,i
tdα,j
CTi
CTj
 = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(PKi, SKi)← Setup(λ)
CTi ← Enc(PKi,mi)
tdα,i ← Tdα()
(PKj , SKj)← Setup(λ)
CTj ← Enc(PKj ,mj)
tdα,j ← Tdα()
 = 1
if mi =mj regardless of whether i = j, where α = 1, 2, 3.
(3) For any security parameter λ, any users Ui, Uj and any messages mi,mj , it holds that
Pr
Test

tdα,i
tdα,j
CTi
CTj
 = 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(PKi, SKi)← Setup(λ)
CTi ← Enc(PKi,mi)
tdα,i ← TdA
(PKj , SKj)← Setup(λ)
CTj ← Enc(PKj ,mj)
tdα,j ← Tdα()

is negligible in λ for any ciphertexts CTi, CTj such that Dec(SKi,CTi) 6= Dec(SKj ,CTj) regardless
of whether i = j, where α = 1, 2, 3.
Security model of PKEET. Because the trapdoor algorithm for Type-3 authorization can be obtained
by the combination of those for Type-1 and Type-2 authorizations, we omit Type-3 authorization queries
and only provide Type-α (α = 1, 2) authorization queries to the adversary in the security games for
simplicity. For the security model of PKEET-FA, we consider two types of adversaries:
• Type-I adversary: for this type, the adversary can request to issue a trapdoor for authorization of the
target user and thus can perform authorization (equality) tests on the challenge ciphertext. The aim
of this type of adversaries is to reveal the message in the challenge ciphertext.
• Type-II adversary: for this type, the adversary cannot request to issue a trapdoor for authorization
of the target user and thus cannot perform equality tests on the challenge ciphertext. The aim of
this type of adversaries is to distinguish which message is in the challenge ciphertext between two
candidates.
The security model of a PKEET scheme against two types of adversaries above is described in the fol-
lowing.
OW-CCA security against Type-I adversaries. We illustrate the game between a challenger C and
a Type-I adversary A who can have a trapdoor for all ciphertexts of the target user, say Uθ, that he
wants to attack, as follows:
1. Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(λ) to generate the key pairs (PKi, SKi) for all users with i =
1, · · · , N , and gives {PKi}Ni=1 to A.
2. Phase 1: The adversary A may make queries polynomially many times adaptively and in any order
to the following oracles:
– OSK: an oracle that on input an index i (different from θ), returns the Ui’s secret key SKi.
– ODec: an oracle that on input a pair of an index i and a ciphertext CTi, returns the output of
Dec(SKi,CTi) using the secret key of the user Ui.
– OTdα for α = 1, 2:
• on input i, OTd1 returns tdi by running td1,i ← Td(SKi).
• On input (i,CTi), OTd2 returns by running td2,i ← Td2(SKi,CTi).
3. Challenge: C chooses a random message m in the message space and run CT∗θ ← Enc(PKθ,m), and
sends CT∗θ to A.
4. Guess: A output m′.
The adversary A wins the above game if m =m′ and the success probability of A is defined as
Adv
OW-CCA,Type−α
A,PKEET (λ) := Pr[m =m
′].
Remark 3. If the message space is polynomial in the security parameter or the min-entropy of the
message distribution is much lower than the security parameter then a Type-I adversary A with a trapdoor
for the challenge ciphertext can reveal the message in polynomial-time or small exponential time in the
security parameter, by performing the equality tests with the challenge ciphertext and all other ciphertexts
of all messages generated by himself. Hence to prevent this attack, we assume that the size of the message
space M is exponential in the security parameter and the min-entropy of the message distribution is
sufficiently higher than the security parameter.
IND-CCA security against Type-II adversaries. We present the game between a challenger C and
a Type-II adversary A who cannot have a trapdoor for all ciphertexts of the target user Uθ as follows:
1. Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(λ) to generate the key pairs (PKi, SKi) for all users with i =
1, · · · , N , and gives {PKi}Ni=1 to A.
2. Phase 1: The adversary A may make queries polynomially many times adaptively and in any order
to the following oracles:
– OSK: an oracle that on input an index i (different from θ), returns the Ui’s secret key SKi.
– ODec: an oracle that on input a pair of an index i and a ciphertext CTi, returns the output of
Dec(SKi,CTi) using the secret key of the user Ui.
– OTdα for α = 1, 2:
• on input i(6= θ), OTd1 returns tdi by running td1,i ← Td(SKi).
• On input (i(6= θ),CTi), OTd2 returns by running td2,i ← Td2(SKi,CTi).
3. Challenge: A chooses message m and pass to C, who then selects a random bit r ∈ {0, 1}. If r = 0,
runs CT∗θ,r ← Enc(PKθ,m); otherwise chose a random ciphertext as CT∗θ,r and sends CT∗θ,r to A.
4. Guess: A output r′.
The adversary A wins the above game if r = r′ and the advantage of A is defined as
Adv
IND-CCA,Type−α
A,PKEET :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[r = r′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
2.2 Lattices
Lattices are discrete subgroups of Zm. Specially, a lattice Λ in Zm with basis B = [b1, · · · ,bn] ∈ Zm×n,
where each bi is written in column form, is defined as
Λ :=
{
n∑
i=1
bixi|xi ∈ Z ∀i = 1, · · · , n
}
⊆ Zm.
We call n the rank of Λ and if n = m we say that Λ is a full rank lattice. In this paper, we mainly
consider full rank lattices containing qZm, called q-ary lattices, defined as the following, for a given
matrix A ∈ Zn×m and u ∈ Znq
Λq(A) :=
{
e ∈ Zm s.t. ∃s ∈ Znq where ATs = e mod q
}
Λ⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = 0 mod q}
Λuq (A) := {e ∈ Zm s.t. Ae = u mod q}
Note that if t ∈ Λuq (A) then Λuq (A) = Λ⊥q (A) + t.
Let S = {s1, · · · , sk} be a set of vectors in Rm. We denote by ‖S‖ := maxi ‖si‖ for i = 1, · · · , k, the
maximum l2 length of the vectors in S. We also denote S˜ := {s˜1, · · · , s˜k} the Gram-Schmidt orthogonal-
ization of the vectors s1, · · · , sk in that order. We refer to ‖S˜‖ the Gram-Schmidt norm of S.
Ajtai [2] first proposed how to sample a uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mq with an associated basis SA of
Λ⊥q (A) with low Gram-Schmidt norm. It is improved later by Alwen and Peikert [3] in the following
Theorem.
Theorem 4. Let q ≥ 3 be odd and m := ⌈6n log q⌉. There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
TrapGen(q, n) that outputs a pair (A ∈ Zn×mq , S ∈ Zm×m) such that A is statistically close to a uniform
matrix in Zn×mq and S is a basis for Λ
⊥
q (A) satisfying
‖S˜‖ ≤ O(
√
n log q) and ‖S‖ ≤ O(n log q)
with all but negligible probability in n.
Definition 5 (Gaussian distribution). Let Λ ⊆ Zm be a lattice. For a vector c ∈ Rm and a positive
parameter σ ∈ R, define:
ρσ,c(x) = exp
(
π
‖x− c‖2
σ2
)
and ρσ,c(Λ) =
∑
x∈Λ
ρσ,c(x).
The discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center c and parameter σ is
∀y ∈ Λ , DΛ,σ,c(y) = ρσ,c(y)
ρσ,c(Λ)
.
For convenience, we will denote by ρσ and DΛ.σ for ρ0,σ and DΛ,σ,0 respectively. When σ = 1 we will
write ρ instead of ρ1. We can extend this definition to a positive definite covariance matrix Σ = BB
T :
ρ√Σ,c(x) = exp(−π(x− c)TΣ−1(x− c)). It is well-known that for a vector x sampled in DZm,σ, one has
that ‖x‖ ≤ tσ√m with overwhelming probability.
We recall below in Theorem 6 some useful result. The first one comes from [17, Lemma 4.4] . The
second one is from [5] and formulated in [1, Theorem 17] and the last one is from [1, Theorem 19].
Theorem 6. Let q > 2 and let A,B be a matrix in Zn×mq with m > n and B is rank n. Let TA, TB be a
basis for Λ⊥q (A) and Λ
⊥
q (B) respectively. Then for c ∈ Rm and U ∈ Zn×tq :
1. Let M be a matrix in Zn×m1q and σ ≥ ‖T˜A‖ω(
√
log(m+m1)). Then there exists a PPT algorithm
SampleLeft(A,M, TA, U, σ) that outputs a matrix e ∈ Z(m+m1)×t distributed statistically close to
DΛUq (F1),σ where F1 := (A | M). In particular e ∈ ΛUq (F1), i.e., F1 · e = U mod q.
In addition, if A is rank n then there is a PPT algorithm SampleBasisLeft(A,M, TA, σ) that outputs
a basis of Λ⊥q (F1).
2. Let R be a matrix in Zk×m and let sR := sup‖x‖=1 ‖Rx‖. Let F2 := (A | AR + B). Then for
σ ≥ ‖T˜B‖sRω(
√
logm), there exists a PPT algorithm
SampleRight(A,B,R, TB, U, σ) that outputs a matrix e ∈ Z(m+k)×t distributed statistically close to
DΛUq (F2),σ. In particular e ∈ ΛUq (F2), i.e., F2 · e = U mod q.
Note that when R is a random matrix in {−1, 1}m×m then sR < O(
√
m) with overwhelming probability
(cf. [1, Lemma 15]).
The security of our construction reduces to the LWE (Learning With Errors) problem introduced by
Regev [18].
Definition 7 (LWE problem). Consider publicly a prime q, a positive integer n, and a distribution χ
over Zq. An (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem instance consists of access to an unspecified challenge oracle O, being
either a noisy pseudorandom sampler Os associated with a secret s ∈ Znq , or a truly random sampler O$
who behaviors are as follows:
Os: samples of the form (ui, vi) = (ui,uTi s+xi) ∈ Znq ×Zq where s ∈ Znq is a uniform secret key, ui ∈ Znq
is uniform and xi ∈ Zq is a noise withdrawn from χ.
O$: samples are uniform pairs in Znq × Zq.
The (Zq , n, χ)-LWE problem allows responds queries to the challenge oracle O. We say that an algorithm
A decides the (Zq, n, χ)-LWE problem if
AdvLWEA :=
∣∣Pr[AOs = 1]− Pr[AO$ = 1]∣∣
is non-negligible for a random s ∈ Znq .
Regev [18] showed that (see Theorem 8 below) when χ is the distribution Ψα of the random variable
⌊qX⌉ mod q where α ∈ (0, 1) and X is a normal random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation
α/
√
2π then the LWE problem is hard.
Theorem 8. If there exists an efficient, possibly quantum, algorithm for deciding the (Zq, n, Ψα)-LWE
problem for q > 2
√
n/α then there is an efficient quantum algorithm for approximating the SIVP and
GapSVP problems, to within O˜(n/α) factors in the l2 norm, in the worst case.
Hence if we assume the hardness of approximating the SIVP and GapSVP problems in lattices of
dimension n to within polynomial (in n) factors, then it follows from Theorem 8 that deciding the LWE
problem is hard when n/α is a polynomial in n.
In this paper, we will also deal with ideal lattices, i.e., lattices arising from polynomial rings. Specially,
when n is a power of two, we consider the ring R := Z[x]/(xn + 1), the ring of integers of the cyclotomic
number field Q[x]/(xn + 1). The ring R is isomorphic to the integer lattice Zn through mapping a
polynomial f =
∑n−1
i=0 fix
i to its vector of coefficients (f0, f1, · · · , fn−1) in Zn. In this paper, we will
consider such ring R and denote by Rq = R/qR = Zq[x]/(x
n + 1) where q = 1 mod 2n is a prime. In
this section, we follow [4] to recall some useful results in ideal lattices.
We use ring variants LWE, proposed by [12], and proven to be as hard as the GapSVP/SIVP problems
on ideal lattices.
Definition 9 (Ring-LWEn,q,DR,σ ). Given a = (a1, · · · , am)T ∈ Rmq a vector of m uniformly random
polynomials, and b = as+ e where s ←֓ U(Rq) and e ←֓ DRm,σ, distinguish (a,b = as + e) from (a,b)
drawn from the uniform distribution over Rmq ×Rmq .
In this paper, we use the ring version of trapdoors for ideal lattices, introduced in [16] and recently
improved in [8].
Definition 10. Define g = (1, 2, 4, · · · , 2k−1)T ∈ Rq with k = ⌈log2(q)⌉ and call g the gadget vector,
i.e., for which the inversion of fgT (z) = g
T z ∈ Rq is easy. The lattice Λ⊥q (gT ) has a publicly known basis
Bq ∈ Rk×k which satisfies that ‖B˜q‖ ≤
√
5.
Definition 11 (g-trapdoor). Let a ∈ Rmq and g ∈ Rkq with k = ⌈log2(q)⌉ and m > k. A g-trapdoor for
a consist in a matrix of small polynomials T ∈ R(m−k)×k, following a discrete Gaussian distribution of
parameter σ, such that
aT
(
T
Ik
)
= hgT
for some invertible element h ∈ Rq. The polynomial h is called the tag associated to T . The quality of the
trapdoor is measured by its largest singular value s1(T ).
Algorithm 1: Algorithm TrapGen(q, σ, a′, h)
Input: the ring modulus q, a Gaussian parameter σ, optional a′ ∈ Rm−kq and h ∈ Rq . If no a
′, h are given,
the algorithm chooses a′ ←֓ U(Rm−kq ) and h = 1.
Output: a ∈ Rmq with its trapdoor T ∈ R
(m−k)×k, of norm ‖T‖ ≤ tσ
√
(m− k)n associated to the tag h.
1 Choose T ←֓ DR(m−k)×k,σ,a = (a
′T |hg − a′TT )T .
2 Return (a, T ).
The Algorithm 1 shows how to generate a random vector a ∈ Rmq together with its trapdoor T .
One of the main algorithm we use in our scheme is the preimage sampling algorithm SamplePre,
illustrated in Algorithm 2, which finds x such that faT (x) = u for a given u ∈ Rq and a public a ∈ Rmq
using the g-trapdoor T of a, where (a, T )← TrapGen(q, σ, a′, h) as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2: Algorithm SamplePre(T, a, h, ζ, σ, α, u)
Input: a ∈ Rmq , with its trapdoor T ∈ R
(m−k)×k associated to an invertible tag h ∈ Rq, u ∈ Rq and ζ, σ, α
three Gaussian parameters
Output: x ∈ Rmq following a discrete Gaussian distribution of parameters ζ satisfying a
Tx = u ∈ Rq.
1 p ← SampleP(q, ζ, α, T ), v ← h−1(u− aTp)
2 z ← SamplePolyG(σ, v), x ← p+
(
T
Ik
)
z
The algorithm SamplePre uses the following two algorithm:
– The algorithm SampleP(q, ζ, α, T ) on input the ring modulus q, ζ and α two Gaussian parameters
and T ←֓ DR(m−k)×k,σ, output p ←֓ DRm,√Σp where Σp = ζ2Im − α2
(
T
Ik
)
(T T Ik).
– The algorithm SamplePolyG on input a Gaussian parameter σ and a target v ∈ Rq, outputs z ←֓
DΛ⊥q (gT ),α,v with α =
√
5σ.
For the special case of the cyclotomic number ring R = Z[x]/(xn+1) in our paper, the algorithm SampleP
can be efficiently implemented as in [8, Section 4.1]. For algorithm SamplePolyG, one needs to call the
algorithm SampleG in [8, Section 3.2] n times.
Our construction follows the IBE construction in [1]. In such a case, we need an encoding hash function
H : Znq → Rq to map identities to Znq to invertible elements in Rq; such an H is called encoding with
Full-Rank Differences (FRD) in [1]. We require that H satisfies the following properties:
– for all distinct u, v ∈ Znq , the element H(u)−H(v) ∈ Rq is invertible; and
– H is computable in polynomial time (in n log(q)).
To implement such an encoding H , there are several methods proposed in [8,6,13] and we refer to [8,
Section 2.4] for more details.
3 PKEET-FA Construction over Integer Lattices
Setup(λ)
On input a security parameter λ, set the parameters q, n,m, σ, α as in section 3.1
1. Use TrapGen(q, n) to generate uniformly random n × m-matrices A,A′ ∈ Zn×mq together with
trapdoors TA and TA′ respectively.
2. Select l + 1 uniformly random n×m matrices A1, · · · , Al, B ∈ Zn×mq .
3. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}t and H ′ : {0, 1}∗ → {−1, 1}l be hash functions.
4. Select a uniformly random matrix U ∈ Zn×tq .
5. Output the public key and the secret key
PK = (A,A′, A1, · · · , Al, B, U) , SK = (TA, TA′).
Encrypt(PK,m)
On input the public key PK and a message m ∈ {0, 1}t, do:
1. Choose a uniformly random s1, s2 ∈ Znq
2. Choose x1,x2 ∈ Ψ tα and compute3
c1 = U
T s1 + x1 +m
⌊q
2
⌋
c2 = U
T s2 + x2 +H(m)
⌊q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq.
3. Choose b ∈ {−1, 1}l, and set
F1 = (A|B +
l∑
i=1
biAi) , F2 = (A
′|B +
l∑
i=1
biAi).
4. Choose l uniformly randommatricesRi ∈ {−1, 1}m×m for i = 1, · · · , l and define R =
∑l
i=1 biRi ∈
{−l, · · · , l}m×m.
5. Choose y1,y2 ∈ Ψmα and set z1 = RTy1, z2 = RTy2 ∈ Zmq .
6. Compute
c3 = F
T
1 s1 + [y
T
1 |zT1 ]T ∈ Z2mq ,
c4 = F
T
2 s2 + [y
T
2 |zT2 ]T ∈ Z2mq .
7. The ciphertext is
CT = (b, c1, c2, c3, c4) ∈ {−1, 1}l × Z2t+4mq .
Decrypt(PK, SK,CT)
On input public key PK, private key SK and a ciphertext CT = (b, c1, c2, c3, c4), do:
1. Sample e ∈ Z2m×t from
e← SampleLeft(A,B +
l∑
i=1
biAi, TA, U, σ).
Note that F1 · e = U in Zn×tq .
2. Compute w← c1 − eT c3 ∈ Ztq.
3. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare wi and ⌊ q2⌋. If they are close, output mi = 1 and otherwise output
mi = 0. We then obtain the message m.
4. Sample e′ ∈ Z2m×t from
e′ ← SampleLeft(A′, B +
l∑
i=1
biAi, TA′ , U, σ).
5. Compute w′ ← c2 − (e′)T c4 ∈ Ztq.
6. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare w′i and ⌊ q2⌋. If they are close, output hi = 1 and otherwise output
hi = 0. We then obtain the vector h.
7. If h = H(m) then output m, otherwise output ⊥.
Let Ui and Uj be two users of the system. We denote by CTi = (ci1, ci2, ci3, ci4) (resp. CTj =
(cj1, cj2, cj3, cj4)) be a ciphertext of Ui (resp. Uj).
Type-1 Authorization
– Td1(SKi): On input a user Ui’s secret key SKi = (Ki,1,Ki,2), it outputs a trapdoor td1,i = Ki,2.
– Test(td1,i, td1,j ,CTi,CTj): On input trapdoors td1,i, td1,j and ciphertexts CTi,CTj for users Ui,Uj
respectively, computes
1. For each i (resp. j), do the following:
• bi = (bi1, · · · , bil) and sample ei ∈ Z2m×t from
ei ← SampleLeft(A′i, Bi +
l∑
k=1
bikAik, TA′
i
, Ui, σ).
Note that Fi2 · ei = Ui in Zn×tq .
3 Note that for a message m ∈ {0, 1}t, we choose a random binary string m′ of fixed length t′ large enough and
by abusing of notation, we write H(m) for H(m′‖m).
• Compute wi ← ci2 − eTi ci4 ∈ Ztq. For each k = 1, · · · , t, compare each coordinate wik
with ⌊ qw ⌋ and output hik = 1 if they are close, and 0 otherwise. At the end, we obtain
the vector hi (resp. hj).
2. Output 1 if hi = hj and 0 otherwise.
Type-2 Authorization :
– Td2(SKi,CTi): On input a user Ui’s secret key SKi = (Ki,1,Ki,2) and ciphertext CTi, it outputs
a trapdoor td2,i in following manner:
bi = (bi1, · · · , bil) and sample td2,i = ei ∈ Z2m×t from
ei ← SampleLeft(A′i, Bi +
l∑
k=1
bikAik, TA′
i
, Ui, σ).
Note that Fi2 · ei = Ui in Zn×tq .
– Test(td2,i, td2,j ,CTi,CTj): On input trapdoors td2,i, td2,j and ciphertexts CTi,CTj for users Ui,Uj
respectively, computes
1. For each i (resp. j), do the following: Compute wi ← ci2− eTi ci4 ∈ Ztq. For each k = 1, · · · , t,
compare each coordinate wik with ⌊ qw ⌋ and output hik = 1 if they are close, and 0 otherwise.
At the end, we obtain the vector hi (resp. hj).
2. Output 1 if hi = hj and 0 otherwise.
Type-3 Authorization :
– Td3,i(SKi,CTi): On input a user Ui’s secret key SKi = (Ki,1,Ki,2) and ciphertext CTi, it outputs
a trapdoor td3,i in following manner:
bi = (bi1, · · · , bil) and sample td2,i = ei ∈ Z2m×t from
ei ← SampleLeft(A′i, Bi +
l∑
k=1
bikAik, TA′
i
, Ui, σ).
Note that Fi2 · ei = Ui in Zn×tq .
– Td3,j(SKj): On input a user Uj’s secret key SKj = (Kj,1,Kj,2), it outputs a trapdoor td3,j = Kj,2.
– Test(td3,i, td3,j ,CTi,CTj): On input trapdoors td3,i, td3,j and ciphertexts CTi,CTj for users Ui,Uj
respectively, computes
1. For each i, do the following: Compute wi ← ci2− eTi ci4 ∈ Ztq. For each k = 1, · · · , t, compare
each coordinate wik with ⌊ qw ⌋ and output hik = 1 if they are close, and 0 otherwise. At the
end, we obtain the vector hi.
2. bj = (bi1, · · · , bjl) and sample ej ∈ Z2m×t from
SampleLeft(A′j , Bj +
l∑
k=1
bjkAjk, TA′
j
, Uj, σ).
Note that Fj2 · ej = Uj in Zn×tq .
3. Compute wj ← cj2 − eTj cj4 ∈ Ztq. For each k = 1, · · · , t, compare each coordinate wjk with
⌊ qw⌋ and output hjk = 1 if they are close, and 0 otherwise. At the end, we obtain the vector
hj .
4. Output 1 if hi = hj and 0 otherwise.
Theorem 12. Our PKEET-FA construction above is correct if H is a collision-resistant hash function.
Proof. It is easy to see that if CT is a valid ciphertext of m then the decryption will always output m.
Moreover, if CTi and CTj are valid ciphertext of m and m
′ of user Ui and Uj respectively. Then the Test
process of Type-α (for α = 1, 2, 3) checks whether H(m) = H(m′). If so then it outputs 1, meaning that
m =m′, which is always correct with overwhelming probability since H is collision resistant. Hence our
PKEET-FA described above is correct.
3.1 Parameters
We follow [1, Section 7.3] for choosing parameters for our scheme. Now for the system to work correctly
we need to ensure
– the error term in decryption is less than q/5 with high probability, i.e., q = Ω(σm3/2) and α <
[σlmω(
√
logm)]−1,
– that the TrapGen can operate, i.e., m > 6n log q,
– that σ is large enough for SampleLeft and SampleRight, i.e., σ > lmω(
√
logm),
– that Regev’s reduction applies, i.e., q > 2
√
n/α,
– that our security reduction applies (i.e., q > 2Q where Q is the number of identity queries from the
adversary).
Hence the following choice of parameters (q,m, σ, α) from [1] satisfies all of the above conditions, taking
n to be the security parameter:
m = 6n1+δ , q = max(2Q,m2.5ω(
√
logn))
σ = mlω(
√
log n) , α = [l2m2ω(
√
logn)]
(1)
and round up m to the nearest larger integer and q to the nearest larger prime. Here we assume that δ
is such that nδ > ⌈log q⌉ = O(log n).
3.2 Security analysis
In this section, we will prove that our proposed scheme is OW-CCA secure against Type-I adversaries
(cf. Theorem 1) and IND-CCA secure against Type-II adversaries (cf. Theorem 2).
Theorem 1. The PKEET with parameters (q, n,m, σ, α) as in (1) is OW-CCA secure provided that H
is a one-way hash function, H ′ is a collision-resistant hash function, and Full-IBE of [1] is IND-CPA
secure based on the hardness of (Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE assumption.
Proof. We show OW-CCA security in the standard model. Let A be a PPT adversary that attacks the
PKEET-FA scheme and has advantage ǫ. We will construct an adversary S that attacks the Full-IBE of
[1] by simulating the view of A, and has advantage ǫ.
The adversary S works as follows:
Let A choose Uθ as target user.
On input PK = (A,A1, · · · , Al, B, U) of Full-IBE, S append A′ in PK, generates TA′ , sets the PKEET-FA
instance for Uθ, and simulates the view of A for Uθ.
For other user Ui, S sets PK = (Ai, A′i, A1, · · · , Al, Bi, Ui), and generates TAi , TA′i by TrapGen(q, n) to
simulates the view of A according to the scheme.
1. Query Phase :
– Secret Key Query: On A’s query for the secret key of i(6= θ)-th user, S generates TAi , TA′i by
TrapGen(q, n) and return to A.
– Decryption Query:
• On A’s query on a pair of an index i(6= θ) and a ciphertext CTi, S returns the output of
Dec(SKi,CTi) using the secret key of the user Ui.
• A’s query on a pair of an index θ and a ciphertext CTθ, S makes secret key query to Full-IBE
oracle for secret key for the identity bθ and receives eθ. S decrypt CTθ according to Dec of
PKEET-FA and returns to A.
– Td1 Query: On A’s query on an index i, S returns td1,i ← Td(SKi).
– Td2 Query: On A’s query on a pair of an index i and a ciphertext CTi, S returns td2,i ←
Td2(SKi,CTi).
2. Challenge Phase : S chooses m from message space and sends m, id∗(6= bθ) to the challenger of
Full-IBE and Encrypt H(m) i.e., c2, c4. Challenger of Full-IBE choose r ←$ {0, 1}.
– If r = 0, Challenger of Full-IBE computes Encrypt(PK, id∗,m) = (c1, c3), and sends (c1, c3) to
S.
– If r = 1, Challenger of Full-IBE chose (c1, c3)←$ Ztq × Z2mq , and sends (c1, c3) to S.
After getting reply, S will send (id∗, c1, c2, c3, c4) to A.
3. Decision Phase :
– If A sends m to S, S will sends r = 0 to the Challenger of Full-IBE.
– If A sends ⊥ to S, S will sends r = 1 to the Challenger of Full-IBE.
So, the simulation of view of A is perfect with the real scheme. So, the winning probability of A
against PKEET-FA is same with the winning probability of S against Full-IBE. Hence, the proof.
Theorem 2. The PKEET with parameters (q, n,m, σ, α) as in (1) is IND-CCA secure provided that H ′
is a collision-resistant hash function, and Full-IBE of [1] is IND-CPA secure based on the hardness of
(Zq, n, Ψ¯α)-LWE assumption.
Proof. We show IND-CCA security in the standard model. Let A be a PPT adversary that attacks the
PKEET-FA scheme and has advantage ǫ. We will construct an adversary S that attacks the Full-IBE of
[1] by simulating the view of A, and has advantage ǫ.
The adversary S works as follows:
Let A choose Uθ as target user.
On input PK = (A,A1, · · · , Al, B, U) of Full-IBE, S append A′ in PK, generates TA′ , sets the PKEET-FA
instance for Uθ, and simulates the view of A for Uθ.
For other user Ui, S sets PK = (Ai, A′i, A1, · · · , Al, Bi, Ui), and generates TAi , TA′i by TrapGen(q, n) to
simulates the view of A according to the scheme.
1. Query Phase :
– Secret Key Query: On A’s query for the secret key of i(6= θ)-th user, S generates TAi , TA′i by
TrapGen(q, n) and return to A.
– Decryption Query:
• On A’s query on a pair of an index i(6= θ) and a ciphertext CTi, S returns the output of
Dec(SKi,CTi) using the secret key of the user Ui.
• A’s query on a pair of an index θ and a ciphertext CTθ, S makes secret key query to Full-IBE
oracle for secret key for the identity bθ and receives eθ. S decrypt CTθ according to Dec of
PKEET-FA and returns to A.
– Td1 Query: On A’s query on an index i(6= θ), S returns td1,i ← Td(SKi).
– Td2 Query: On A’s query on a pair of an index i(6= θ) and a ciphertext CTi, S returns td2,i ←
Td2(SKi,CTi).
2. Challenge Phase : S receives m from A. S sends m, id∗(6= bθ) to the challenger of Full-IBE and
Encrypt H(m) i.e., c2, c4. Challenger of Full-IBE choose r ←$ {0, 1}.
– If r = 0, Challenger of Full-IBE computes Encrypt(PK, id∗,m) = (c1, c3), and sends (c1, c3) to
S.
– If r = 1, Challenger of Full-IBE chose (c1, c3)←$ Ztq × Z2mq , and sends (c1, c3) to S.
After getting reply, S will send (id∗, c1, c2, c3, c4) to A.
3. Decision Phase : S will receive r′ from A and passes to the challenger of Full-IBE.
So, the simulation of view of A is perfect with the real scheme. So, the winning probability of A
against PKEET-FA is same with the winning probability of S against Full-IBE. Hence, the proof.
4 Instantiation from Lee et al. [9]
Setup(λ)
On input security parameter λ, and a maximum hierarchy depth 2, set the parameters q, n,m, σ¯, α¯.
The vector σ¯ & α¯ ∈ R2 and we use σl and αl to refer to their l- th coordinate.
1. Use algorithm TrapGen(q, n) to select uniformly random n ×m- matrices A,A′ ∈ Zn×mq with a
basis TA, TA′ for Λ
⊥
q (A), Λ
⊥
q (A
′), respectively. Repeat this Step until A,A′ has rank n.
2. Select 3 uniformly random m×m matrices A1, A2, B ∈ Zn×mq .
3. Select a uniformly random matrix U ∈ Zn×tq .
4. We need some hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}t, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {−1, 1}t, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq
and a full domain difference map H ′ : Znq → Zn×nq as in [1, Section 5].
5. Output the public key and the secret key
PK = (A,A1, A2, B, U) , SK = (TA, TA′).
Enc(PK,m)
On input the public key PK and a message m ∈ {0, 1}t do
1. Choose uniformly random s1, s2 ∈ Znq .
2. Choose x1,x2 ∈ Ψ tα and compute
c1 = U
T s1 + x1 +m
⌊q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq,
c2 = U
T s2 + x2 +H(m)
⌊q
2
⌋ ∈ Ztq.
3. Select uniformly random l − 2 matrices A3, · · · , Al ∈ Zn×mq and set vk = A3‖ · · · ‖Al.
4. Set id := H2(vk) ∈ Znq .
5. Build the following matrices in Zn×3mq :
F1 = (A|A1 +H ′(0) ·B|A2 +H ′(id) · B),
F2 = (A|A1 +H ′(1) ·B|A2 +H ′(id) · B).
6. Choose a uniformly random n× 2m matrix R in {−1, 1}n×2m.
7. Choose y1,y2 ∈ Ψmα and set z1 = RTy1, z2 = RTy2 ∈ Z2mq .
8. Compute
c3 = F
T
1 s1 + [y
T
1 |zT1 ]T ∈ Z3mq ,
c4 = F
T
2 s2 + [y
T
2 |zT2 ]T ∈ Z3mq .
9. Let b := H1(c1‖c2‖c3‖c4) ∈ {−1, 1}l and define a matrix
F = (A′|B +
l∑
i=1
biAi) ∈ Zn×2mq .
10. Extract a signature e′ ∈ Z2m×t by
e′ ← SampleLeft(A′, B +
l∑
i=1
biAi, TA′ , 0, σ).
Note that F · e′ = 0 mod q.
11. Output the ciphertext
CT = (vk, c1, c2, c3, c4, e
′).
Dec(SK,CT)
On input a secret key SK and a ciphertext CT, do
1. Parse the ciphertext CT into
(vk, c1, c2, c3, c4, e).
2. Let b := H1(c1‖c2‖c3‖c4) ∈ {−1, 1}l and define a matrix
F = (A′|B +
l∑
i=1
biAi) ∈ Zn×2mq .
3. If F · e′ = 0 in Zq and ‖e‖ ≤ σ
√
2m then continue to Step 4; otherwise output ⊥.
4. Set id := H2(vk) ∈ Znq and build the following matrices in Zn×3mq :
F1 = (A|A1 +H ′(0) ·B|A2 +H ′(id) · B),
F2 = (A|A1 +H ′(1) ·B|A2 +H ′(id) · B).
5. Use the secret key SK = TA and the algorithm SampleLeft to sample matrices e1, e2 ∈ Z3m×tq
such that F1 · e1 = U and F2 · e2 = U in Zn×tq .
6. Compute w← c1 − eT1 c3 ∈ Ztq.
7. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare wi and ⌊ q2⌋. If they are close, output mi = 1 and otherwise output
mi = 0. We then obtain the message m.
8. Compute w′ ← c2 − eT2 c4 ∈ Ztq.
9. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare w′i and ⌊ q2⌋. If they are close, output hi = 1 and otherwise output
hi = 0. We then obtain the vector h.
10. If h = H(m) then output m, otherwise output ⊥.
Td(SKi)
On input the secret key SKi of a user Ui, run
tdi ← SampleBasisLeft(Ai, Bi +H ′(1) ·Ai,1)
and returns the trapdoor tdi ∈ Z2m×2mq . Note that
(Ai‖Bi +H ′(1) · Ai,1) · tdi = 0 ∈ Zn×2mq .
Test(tdi, tdj ,CTi,CTj)
On input trapdoors tdi, tdj and ciphertexts CTi,CTj of users Ui and Uj respectively, for k = i, j, do
the following
1. Parse CTk into
(vkk, ck,1, ck,2, ck,3, ck,4, ek).
2. Set A¯k = (Ak|Bk +H ′(1) ·Ak,1). Sample ek ∈ Z3m×tq from
SampleLeft(A¯k, Bk +H
′(idk) ·Ak,2, tdk, U, σ).
3. Use ek to decrypt ck,2, ck,4 as in Step 8-9 of Dec(SK,CT) above to obtain the hash value hk.
4. If hi = hj then ouput 1; otherwise output 0.
Theorem 13 (Correctness). The above PKEET is correct if the hash function H is collision resistant.
Proof. Since we employ the multi-bit HIBE and signature scheme from [1], their correctness follow
from [1]. The Theorem follows from [9, Theorem 1].
Parameters We follow [1, Section 8.3] for choosing parameters for our scheme. Now for the system to
work correctly we need to ensure
– the error term in decryption is less than q/5 with high probability, i.e., q = Ω(σm3/2) and α <
[σlmω(
√
logm)]−1,
– that the TrapGen can operate, i.e., m > 6n log q,
– that σ is large enough for SampleLeft and SampleRight, i.e., σ > lmω(
√
logm),
– that Regev’s reduction applies, i.e., q > 2
√
n/α,
Hence the following choice of parameters (q,m, σ, α) from [1] satisfies all of the above conditions, taking
n to be the security parameter:
m = 6n1+δ , q = max(2Q,m2.5ω(
√
logn))
σ = mlω(
√
log n) , α = [l2m2ω(
√
logn)]
(2)
and round up m to the nearest larger integer and q to the nearest larger prime. Here we assume that δ
is such that nδ > ⌈log q⌉ = O(log n).
Theorem 14. The PKEET constructed in Section 4 with paramaters as in (2) is IND-CCA2 secure
provided that H1 is collision resistant.
Proof. The HIBE is IND-sID-CPA secure by [1, Theorem 33] and the signature is strongly unforgeable
by [1, Section 7.5]. The result follows from [9, Theorem 2].
Theorem 15 ([9, Theorem 3]). The PKEET with parameters (q, n,m, σ, α) as in (2) is OW-CCA2
provided that H is one-way and H1 is collision resistant.
Proof. The HIBE is IND-sID-CPA secure by [1, Theorem 33] and the signature is strongly unforgeable
by [1, Section 7.5]. The result follows from [9, Theorem 3].
5 PKEET-FA over Ideal Lattices
The parameters of the scheme are n,m, q, k and σ, α, γ, τ and ζ are real numbers, and chosen as in
Section 5.
Construction
Setup(1n)
On input the security parameter 1n, do the following:
1. Compute a ∈ Rmq associated to its trapdoor Ta ∈ R(m−k)×k, (a, Ta)← TrapGen(q, σ, h = 0), i.e.,
a = ((a′)T | − (a′)TTa)T
2. Compute b ∈ Rmq associated to its trapdoor Tb ∈ R(m−k)×k, (b, Tb)← TrapGen(q, σ, h = 0), i.e.,
b = ((b′)T | − (b′)TTb)T
3. Sample uniformly random u ←֓ U(Rq).
4. Output PK = (a,b, u) ∈ R2m+1q and SK = (Ta, Tb)
Enc(PK,M)
Given a message M ∈ R2, do the following
1. Sample s1, s2 ←֓ U(Rq), e′1, e′2 ←֓ DR,τ and compute
CT1 = u · s1 + e′1 +M · ⌊q/2⌋ ∈ Rq,
CT2 = u · s2 + e′2 +H ′(M) · ⌊q/2⌋ ∈ Rq.
where H ′ is a hash function mapping from {0, 1}∗ to the message space M.
2. Choose a random v ∈ Znq and compute h = H(v) ∈ Rq.
3. Compute ah = a
T + (0|hg)T = ((a′)T |hg− (a′)TTa)T .
4. Compute bh = b
T + (0|hg)T = ((b′)T |hg− (b′)TTb)T .
5. Choose y,y′ ←֓ DRm−k,τ , z, z′ ∈ DRk,γ and compute
CT3 = ah · s1 + (yT , zT )T ∈ Rmq ,
CT4 = bh · s2 + ((y′)T , (z′)T )T ∈ Rmq .
Output the ciphertext
CT = (v,CT1,CT2,CT3,CT4) ∈ R2m+3q .
Dec(SK,CT)
On input the secret key SK = (Ta, Tb) and a ciphertext CT = (v,CT1,CT2,CT3,CT4), do the follow-
ing:
1. Compute h = H(v) and construct ah and bh as in Step 3 and 4 in the Encryption process.
2. Sample short vectors x,x′ ∈ Rmq :
x← SamplePre(Ta, ah, h, ζ, σ, α, u)
x′ ← SamplePre(Tb,bh, h, ζ, σ, α, u)
3. Compute w = CT1 − CTT3 x ∈ Rq.
4. For each wi, if it is closer to ⌊q/2⌋ than to 0, then output Mi = 1, otherwise Mi = 0. Then we
obtain the message M .
5. Compute w′ = CT2 − CTT4 x′ ∈ Rq.
6. For each w′i, if it is closer to ⌊q/2⌋ than to 0, then output hi = 1, otherwise hi = 0. Then we
obtain an element h.
7. If h = H ′(M) then output M , otherwise output ⊥.
Let Ui and Uj be two users of the system. We denote by CTi = (CTi,1,CTi,2,CTi,3,CTi,4) (resp.
CTj = (CTj,1,CTj,2,CTj,3,CTj,4)) be a ciphertext of Ui (resp. Uj).
Type-1 Authorization
– Td1(SKi): On input a user Ui’s secret key SKi = (Ti,a, Ti,b), it outputs a trapdoor td1,i = Ti,b.
– Test(td1,i, td1,j ,CTi,CTj): On input trapdoors td1,i, td1,j and ciphertexts CTi,CTj for users Ui, Uj
respectively, computes
1. For each i (resp. j), do the following
(a) Compute hi = H(vi) and sample x
′
i ∈ Rmq from
x′i ← SamplePre(Ti,b,bh, hi, ζ, σ, α, u).
(b) Compute wi = CTi,2 − CTTi,4x′i. For each k = 1, · · · , n, if wi,k is closer to ⌊q/2⌋ than to
0, then output hik = 1, otherwise hik = 0. Then we obtain the element hi (resp. hj).
2. Output 1 if hi = hj , and 0 otherwise.
Type-2 Authorization
– Td2(SKi,CTi): On input a user Ui’s secret key SKi = (Ti,a, Ti,b) and ciphertext CTi = (vi,CTi,1,CTi,2,CTi,3,CTi,4),
it samples x′i ∈ Rmq from
x′i ← SamplePre(Ti,b,bh, hi, ζ, σ, α, u).
it outputs a trapdoor td2,i = x
′
i.
– Test(td2,i, td2,j ,CTi,CTj): On input trapdoors td2,i, td2,j and ciphertexts CTi,CTj for users Ui, Uj
respectively, do the following
1. Compute wi = CTi,2 − CTTi,4x′i. For each k = 1, · · · , n, if wi,k is closer to ⌊q/2⌋ than to 0,
then output hik = 1, otherwise hik = 0. Then we obtain the element hi (resp. hj).
2. Output 1 if hi = hj , and 0 otherwise.
Type-3 Authorization
– Td3,i(SKi,CTi): On input a user Ui’s secret key SKi = (Ti,a, Ti,b) and ciphertext CTi, it outputs
a trapdoor td3,i = x
′
i by sampling
x′i ← SamplePre(Ti,b,bh, hi, ζ, σ, α, u).
– Td3,j(SKj): On input a user Uj ’s secret key SKj = (Tj,a, Tj,b), it outputs a trapdoor td3,j = Tj,b.
– Test(tdi,3tdj,3,CTi,CTj): On input trapdoors td3,i, tdj,3 and ciphertexts CTi,CTj for users Ui, Uj
respectively, do the following
1. Compute wi = CTi,2 − CTTi,4x′i. For each k = 1, · · · , n, if wi,k is closer to ⌊q/2⌋ than to 0,
then output hik = 1, otherwise hik = 0. Then we obtain the element hi.
2. Compute hj = H(vj) and sample x
′
j ∈ Rmq from
x′j ← SamplePre(Tj,b,bh, hj , ζ, σ, α, u).
3. Compute wj = CTj,2 − CTTj,4x′j . For each k = 1, · · · , n, if wj,k is closer to ⌊q/2⌋ than to 0,
then output hjk = 1, otherwise hjk = 0. Then we obtain the element hj .
4. Output 1 if hi = hj , and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 16 (Correctness). With the choice of parameters as in 5, our proposed PKEET is correct,
assuming that the hash function H ′ is collision-resitant.
Proof. Let x = (xT0 |xT1 )T with x0 ∈ Rm−kq and x1 ∈ Rkq . To correctly decrypt a ciphertext, we need the
error term e′1 − (yT |zT )(xT0 |xT1 )T = e′1 − yTx0 − zTx1 to be bounded by ⌊q/4⌋, which is satisfied by the
choice of parameters in 5. Similarly, for the test procedure, one needs to correctly decrypt H ′(M) and
the equality test works correctly given that H ′ is collision-resistant.
Security analysis In this section, we will prove that our proposed scheme is OW-CCA secure against
Type-I adversaries (cf. Theorem 17) and IND-CCA secure against Type-II adversaries (cf. Theorem 18).
Theorem 17 (OW-CCA). The proposed PKEET scheme with parameter (q, n,m, σ, α) as in Section 5 is
OW-CCA secure provided that H ′ is one-way hash function, H is a collision resistant hash function and
the Ring-LWEn,q,DR,σ problem is hard. In particular, suppose there exists a probabilistic algorithm A
that wins the OW-CCA game with advantage ǫ then there is a probabilistic algorithm B that solves that
Ring-LWEn,q,DR,σ problem with advantage ǫ
′ such that
ǫ′ ≥ ǫ− ǫH′,OW − ǫH,CR
where ǫH′,OW and ǫH,CR are the advantage of breaking the one-wayness of H
′ and the collision resistance
of H respectively.
Proof. The proof follows that of [7, Theorem 5] and [4, Theorem 1]. Assume that there exists a Type-I
adversary A who breaks the OW-CCA security of the PKEET scheme with non-negligible probability ǫ.
We construct an algorithm B who solves the RLWE problem using A. Assume again that there are N
users in our PKEET system. We now describe the behaviors of B. Assume that θ is the target index of
the adversary A and the challenge ciphertext is CT∗θ = (v∗,CT∗θ,1,CT∗θ,2,CT∗θ,3,CT∗θ,4).
We will proceed the proof in a sequence of games. In Game i, let Wi denote the event that the
adversary A win the game. The adversary’s advantage in Game i is Pr[Wi].
Game 0. This is the original OW-CCA game between the attacker A against the scheme and the
OW-CCA challenger.
Game 1. This is similar to Game 0 except that at the challenge phase, B chooses two messageM and
M ′ in the message space and encrypt M in CT∗θ,1 and H
′(M ′) in CT∗θ,2. Other steps are similar to
Game 0. Since A may have a trapdoor Tdα (for α = 1, 2) then he can obtain H ′(M ′). At the end, if
A outputs M ′, call this event E1, then A has broken the one-wayness of H ′. Thus Pr[E1] ≤ ǫH′,OW
where ǫH′,OW is the advantage of A in breaking the one-wayness of H ′. Therefore, one has
Pr[W0]− Pr[W1] ≤ ǫH′,OW.
Game 2. This is similar to Game 1 except the way the challenge B generates the public key for the user
with index θ, and the challenge ciphertext CT∗θ as the following. At the start of the experiment, choose
a random v∗ ∈ Znq and let the public parameter a generated by TrapGen(q, σ, a′,−h∗θ) where h∗θ =
H(v∗). Hence, the public parameter is a = ((a′)T | − h∗θg− (a′)TTa)T , where the first part a′ ∈ Rm−kq
is chosen from the uniform distribution. For the second part a′TTa = (
∑m−k
i=1 aiti,1, · · · ,
∑m−k
i=1 aiti,k)
is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. In our paper, we choose m− k = 2 and a′ = (1, a)
with a ←֓ U(Rq) and the public key a = (1, a| − (at2,1 + t1,1), · · · ,−(at2,k + t1,k)) looks uniform
followed by the RLWE assumption, given that the secret and error follow the same distribution. The
remainder of the game is unchanged and similar to Game 1.
Note that whenever A queries ODec(θ,CTθ) with CTθ = (v,CTθ,1,CTθ,2,CTθ,3,CTθ,4) then B does as
follows. If v = 0 or v = v∗ then B aborts. Otherwise, B can answer as usual using the trapdoor Ta,
except if H(v) = h∗θ, which happens with probability at most the advantage ǫH,CR of breaking the
collision-resistance of H . It follows that
Pr[W2]− Pr[W1] ≤ ǫH,CR.
Game 3. In this game, the challenge ciphertext CT∗θ is now chosen uniformly in R
2m+3
q . We now show
that Game 3 and Game 2 are indistinguishable for A by doing a reduction from RLWE problem.
Now B receives m − k + 1 samples (ai, bi)0≤i≤m−k as an instance of the decisional RLWE prob-
lem. Let a′ = (a1, · · · , am−k)T ∈ Rm−kq and b′ = (b1, · · · , bm−k)T ∈ Rm−kq . The simulator runs
TrapGen(q, σ, a′,−h∗θ), and we get a = ((a′)T | − h∗θg − (a′)TTa)T as in Game 2. Similarly, the simu-
lator runs TrapGen(q, σ,b′,−h∗θ) to get b = ((b′)T | − h∗θg − (b′)TTa)T . Next B set u = a0 and sends
PKθ = (a,b, u) to A as the public key of the user θ.
At the challenge phase, the simulator chooses a message M and computes the challenge ciphertext
CT∗θ ← Enc(PKθ,M) as follows:
1. Set CT∗θ,1 ← b0 +M · ⌊q/2⌋.
2. Choose a uniformly random s2 ∈ Rq and e′2 ←֓ DR,τ and compute
CT∗θ,2 = u · s2 + e′2 +H ′(M) · ⌊q/2⌋ ∈ Rq.
3. Set
CT∗θ,3 =
[
b′
−b′Ta + ê
]
∈ Rmq
with ê ←֓ DRkq , u for some real µ.
4. Compute h∗θ = H(v
∗) ∈ Rq.
5. Choose y′ ←֓ DRm−k,τ , z′ ←֓ RRk,γ and set
CT∗θ,4 = bhθ · s2 + ((y′)T , (z′)T )T ∈ Rmq .
Then B sends CT∗θ = (v∗,CT∗θ,1,CT∗θ,2,CT∗θ,3,CT∗θ,4) to A.
When the samples (ai, bi) are LWE samples, then b
′ = a′s1 + e′ and b0 = a0s1 + e0 for some s1 ∈ Rq
and e0 ←֓ DR,τ , e′ ←֓ DRm−k,τ . It implies that
CT∗θ,1 = u · s1 + e0 +M · ⌊q/2⌋
and
CT∗θ,3 = ahθ · s1 + (e′T |zT )
where z = −e′TTa + êT is indistinguishable from a sample drawn from the distribution DRk,γ with
γ2 = (σ‖e′‖)2 + µ2 for µ well chosen.
Then CT∗θ is a valid ciphertext.
When the (ai, bi) are uniformly random in R
2
q , then obviously CT
∗
θ also looks uniform.
A guesses if it is interacting with Game 3 or Game 2. The simulator outputs the final guess as the
answer to the RLWE problem. One can easily obtain that
Pr[W3]− Pr[W2] ≤ ǫ′.
Combining the above results we obtain
ǫ = Pr[W0] ≤ ǫH′,OW + ǫH,CR + ǫ′
which implies
ǫ′ ≥ ǫ− ǫH,CR − ǫH′,OW.
Theorem 18 (IND-CCA). The proposed PKEET scheme with parameter (q, n,m, σ, α) as in... is IND-CCA
secure provided that H is a one-way hash function, H ′ is a collision resistant hash function and the
Ring-LWEn,q,DR,σ is hard. In particular, suppose there exists a probabilistic algorithm A that wins the
IND-CCA game with advantage ǫ then there is a probabilistic algorithm B that solves that Ring-LWEn,q,DR,σ
problem with advantage ǫ′ such that
ǫ′ ≥ ǫ− ǫH,CR,
where ǫH,CR is the advantage of breaking the collision resistance of H.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 17 and that of [7, Theorem 6], hence we omit the proof
here. Note that in this proof, we do not consider Game 1 as in Theorem 17 , which results in not having
ǫH′,OW in the advantage formula.
Parameters We follow [4, Section 4.2] for choosing parameters for our scheme as the following:
1. The modulus q is choosen to be a prime of size 62 bits.
2. We choose m− k = 2.
3. The Gaussian parameter σ for the trapdoor sampling is σ >
√
(ln(2n/ǫ)/π) ([16]) where n is the
maximum length of the ring polynomials, and ǫ is the desired bound on the statistical error introduced
by each randomized rounding operation. This parameter is also chosen to ensure the hardness of
Ring-LWEn,q,DR,σ problem.
4. The Gaussian parameter σ for the G-sampling is α =
√
5σ ([16]).
5. The parameter ζ is chosen such that ζ >
√
5Cσ2(
√
kn +
√
2n + t′) for C ∼= 1/
√
2π and t′ ≥ 0,
following [8].
6. For decrypting correctly, we need
tτ
√
n+ 2t2τζn+ t2γζkn < ⌊q/4⌋.
7. Finally, we choose µ = tστ
√
2n and γ = 2tστ
√
n so that γ satisfies γ2 = (σ‖e′‖)2 + µ2.
8. The parameter t here is chosen such that a vector x sampled in DZm,σ has norm ‖x‖ ≤ tσ
√
m. Note
that
Prx←֓DZ,σ [|x| > tσ] ≤ erfc(t/
√
2)
with erfc(x) = 1− 2π
∫ x
0
exp−t
2
dt. One can choose, for example, t = 12 (see [4, Section 2]).
6 Discussion
PKEET-FA over integer lattices has lowest ciphertext and secret key sizes. But, public key sizes is lowest
in case of PKEET-FA over ideal lattices. We have provided a comparative study of data sizes among the
proposed schemes in table 2.
Table 2. Comparison among Proposed PKEET-FA.
Scheme Ciphertext Public Key Secret Key
Section 3 l + (2t+ 4m) log q ((l + 3)mn+ nt) log q 2m2 log q
Section 4 (8m+ 2t+ 2mt) log q (4mn+ nt) log q 2m2 log q
Section 5 n(2m+ 3) log q n(2m+ 1) log q 2nk(m− k) log q
Data sizes are in number of bits.
Test Setup Encrypt Decrypt Td1 Td2 Td3,(i,j) Test1 Test2 Test3
Time (ms) 4.644 7.772 38.618 0,0001 37.715 18.647 37.776 0.8203 19.648
Table 3. Test results, average time in ms after 1000 runs, security λ = 195
7 Implementation of PKEET-FA over Ideal Lattices
We discuss here a small test implementation we created. The following code hosted at https:\\github.
com\TBDThe purpose of this implementation is to serve as a baseline for further efficiency improvements.
While the whole program architecture is different, we attempted to keep all the primitives identical
from sampling to memory allocations. The results of the computations are shown in the table 3. The
computations were done on a Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8665U CPU @ 1.90GHz processor using theWindows
Subsystem for Linux. Note that our timing tests were done sequentially, without the use of multithreading
to run test samples as it was the case in https://github.com/lbibe/code/blob/master/src/main.cpp.
Some primitives use multithreading whenever it was also used on the available code of lbibe. Note that
the thread number was set to 2. The results presented in table 3 are consistent according to the design
of the scheme.
We do not provide any comparison in this paper: most comparisons available online and used in the
current literature are NIST candidates, which follow specific requirements and have various degrees of
optimizations that are, in our honest opinion, not consistent between schemes. As far as we know, no
NIST submissions have an equality test implemented.
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